Friends, it seems that my digital signature has been exposed. This signature protects the app from fake and malicious updates, so there is a risk that someone may try to release counterfeit versions under my name.
To completely eliminate any threats, I’ve decided to stop using the current signature and switch to a new one. Because of this, the app’s identifier will also change. You don’t need to delete the old app (but it will no longer receive updates) — the new one will install as a separate app and will need to be configured again.
Thank you for your understanding and attention to security.[1][2]
---------------
There aren't any new apk releases on GitHub yet. However, concerningly, the SmartTube website (which I won't link directly) still offers undated "Stable" and "Beta" downloads.
It sucks to deal with security breaches as an indie or solo dev, but I'll be waiting for a more detailed postmortem before assessing whether to install a future release... Hopefully one that details new security procedures to guard both the dev's key and the production build environment.
Factory resetting my Shield as a precaution, but nothing sensitive was really on there, and Android's security model did exactly what it was supposed to and limited the damage. When using a third party app like this, it's prudent to use it signed out or else with a purpose specific Google/YouTube account which is connected to nothing else critical.
[1]: https://github.com/yuliskov/SmartTube/releases/tag/notificat...
Seems it's lacking in information about how a malware manages to compromise supposedly signed releases? Do authors not have the production signing keys behind a password or similar, and review 100% of the changes before they deploy stuff?
I swear the more time goes on, the more I'm loosing faith in the entire ecosystem. People running random binaries on the same device they do banking on always surprised me, but now developers manages to get malware on their developer machine and are publishing random binaries to other strangers???
When we move away from walled gardens (which I support), the burden of verifying the "chain of custody" shifts to the user. Installing an APK that auto-updates with root/system privileges is essentially giving a single developer the keys to your living room.
We need better intermediate trust models—like reproducible builds signed by a quorum of maintainers—rather than just "trust this GitHub release."
I hope that Flatpak and similar technologies are adopted more widely on desktop computers. With such security technology existing, giving every application full access to the system is no longer appropriate.
Which channel distributed the compromised apk? What is the signature of the payload injected? What is the payload, what does it do?
Maybe should actually switch to releasing via F-Droid.
Yeah, I'll pass.
Where can I read more about *unrequested uninstalls*? Google search only shows results about how impossible it is to remove phone default apps.