> A remote unauthenticated attacker can silently replace existing printers’ (or install new ones) IPP urls with a malicious one, resulting in arbitrary command execution (on the computer) *when a print job is started (from that computer).*

(emphasis mine)

There's no way this is 9.9 when Heartbleed was just 7.5...

EDIT: Wanted to add why I think he has overblown this way too much. His original tweet stated "* Unauthenticated RCE vs all GNU/Linux systems (plus others)" but as we can see this isn't nearly the case as on a lot of distros CUPS only listens on loopback or isn't installed at all.

Another point:

> Full disclosure, I’ve been scanning the entire public internet IPv4 ranges several times a day for weeks, sending the UDP packet and logging whatever connected back. And I’ve got back connections from hundreds of thousands of devices, with peaks of 200-300K concurrent devices

If I'm understanding this correctly, he only found 300 thousand open CUPS instances in the whole public IPv4. Remember - the CUPS server needs to receive a print job in order for the RCE to happen, which I doubt most of these instances will get.

In summary, there's a service (CUPS) that is exposed to the LAN (0.0.0.0) on at least some desktop flavors of Linux and runs as root that is vulnerable to unauth RCE. CUPS is not a default service on most of the server-oriented linux machines like Ubuntu Server or CentOS, but does appear to start by default on most desktop flavors of linux. To trigger the RCE the user on the vulnerable linux machine must print a document after being exploited.

Evilsocket claims to have had 100's of thousands of callbacks showing that despite the fact most of us have probably never printed anything from Linux, the impact is enough to create a large botnet regardless.

Saying that all systems running cups can be hacked is a misrepresentation of the scale of the issue.

  1 - cups-browsed is able to install printers automatically (without the requirement of user confirmation) by listening to UDP packets on port 631.
  2 - Attacker uses this "feature" to install a fake printer with a custom driver (which is also installed without user confirmation and can be downloaded from an arbitrary host) which specifies the "command to run" when a print job is sent.
  3 - User prints something in the fake printer and the "command to run" is executed.

The unfortunate reality is that for every well-researched report like this one, you get 57 low-effort spam reports that hope to extract a bug bounty reward, or get a CVE discovery listed on their resume. Especially with the rise of LLMs that kind of spam can easily trick you. It's a sad situation, but I don't entirely blame developers for being skeptic.

You probably already know exim4 (to be fair it listens to only localhost by default, so maybe not a big deal). I just tried to install cups-browsed on one of my Debian machine, and it brought up two services that listens to 0.0.0.0 (cups-browsed and avahi).

This is not the case for Arch/Gentoo and CentOS-like distros.

Wait for a print job to be sent to our fake printer for the PPD directives, and therefore the command, to be executed.

If Alice never hits print it seems like a print job will never be triggered. Am I missing something? I'm not questioning evilsocket, I'm trying to check my understanding.

Saying it affects all "Linux" systems is just wild.

Imagine even having that thing on your system to begin with.

However, this is only for this particular exploit. The behaviour where cups-browsed automatically downloads and installs printers from random untrusted places on the internet is insane, especially as it does it for all printers it discovers on the local network by default. At minimum anyone on a LAN can cause a DoS type attack against all Linux workstations on the same LAN by just advertising a few million printers via zeroconf.

Windows does this too, I believe. At least it did it with a Xerox laser printer I bought and the Brother printer at my friend's place.

[1]: https://www.usenix.org/system/files/login/articles/login_aug...

Still, kudos to the author who found it, it's going to definitely be a career boost with all the world is ending headlines.

I don't know, last time i bought a new printer i plugged it into my LAN and my Apple machines automatically showed it to me and I could print to it.

Why blame Linux?

From Red Hat's statement: > Red Hat rates these issues with a severity impact of Important. While all versions of RHEL are affected, it is important to note that affected packages are not vulnerable in their default configuration.

Basically, Red Hat machines aren't vulnerable unless "the cups-browsed service has manually been enabled or started."

https://www.redhat.com/en/blog/red-hat-response-openprinting...

  sudo ufw enable

Unfortunately, Firefox removed that feature, and port 9100 is now clobbered by the Prometheus node exporter. If you accidentally add a AppSocket capable printer to Prometheus it will print out HTTP headers every other minute.

The good times are over, but on the other side, having to print something has gotten quite rare.

OK, sure, the program itself maybe safe (enough to run with root while listening a local port that everybody uses this computer can access), but is it really THAT evil if you don't run it 24/7 and instead only enable it when the user is actively using it?

has the president been briefed yet?

it's not a complete disaster like it was implied to be though

...anyways, maybe they were vulnerable to this attack at the time?

Honestly, this looks intentional.