I'd like to know how an accountant would respond to the above. Based on his two examples, it seems like accounting rules really distort the financial picture of a company.
His “Autodesk File” is an interesting read because it’s not the usual “just so” kind of startup memoir that tries to explain how success was preordained by the founder’s genius, but instead a collection of actual documents like memos in chronological order:
We both used the name "Acme" in our gadget names and he came by to see what I was building. He was wearing a Wile E. Coyote avatar.
It wasn't until after he left that I noticed he was one of the original authors of AutoCAD.
He was very prolific at writing code in Second Life from the beginning of the pandemic until shortly before his death.
He was very thorough in writing documentation for all the free code he wrote, and even included detailed diaries of his development of his neat gadgets.
His products were all removed from the Second Life store after his death, but I'm trying to get it all back up for people to enjoy. The code is still on github, but I'm trying to recreate some of the 3d objects needed for that code to work.
Given that your largest customers are generally your most profitable, the market was simply telling AutoDesk at the time that it was spending more than its peers selling to large enterprises and matching per-seat SMB sales costs shouldn't be their benchmark for enterprise sales costs.
By shifting the target from $500 to $375/seat cost of sales, AutoDesk would have kept their margins but doubled their returns. Alternatively, AutoDesk could keep the cost of sales unchanged ($500) and bump up the enterprise price from $1,000 to a little over $1,125, and achieve the same goal. The market doesn't care which approach AutoDesk takes, but it knows the company was giving away too much margin on enterprise sales. Most modern SaaS companies today take the later approach, except they would charge enterprises $2,500/seat instead of a little over $1,125/seat.
AutoDesk has had some very forward thinking senior leadership at different points in its history, but it's also made some missteps. Writing a wonderful assault on the accounting industry instead of realizing that enterprises will pay $2,500 for the same thing SMB's are buying for $1,000 is an example of one of those missteps (and yes, AutoDesk eventually figured how to screw over customers with pricing, but that's another misstep, explaining why I no longer own any AutoDesk products).
I think this is why I have so much respect for Pat Gelsinger. He really was trying to save Intel, so much so that it cost him his job.
Quote:
     This is the pit into which HP and IBM have fallen. They want to maintain margins to keep Wall Street happy, but the easiest way to do that is by cutting costs. Eventually this will be visible in declining sales, which IBM has now experienced for three straight years. Yet with a combination of clever accounting and bad judgement even declining sales can be masked… for awhile.This phrase "confusing the scoreboard with the game" is golden!
IL14 is a lot better than Cringely's commentary on it: https://www.fourmilab.ch/autofile/www/chapter2_86.html
HP, by contrast, has been somewhat adrift even after all the boardroom drama.
I’ve never seen a software company pay 50% commissions on a software sale. I know it’s and example but the percentages are wrong even for the perpetually licensed days. Should be closer to 8-15%.
Totally sales and marketing spend could indeed be higher in this model because autodesk moved to direct positioning with end buyers rather than distributors.
Foreground is a product of the background.