Yes, the loose wire was the immediate cause, but there was far more going wrong here. For example:

- The transformer switchover was set to manual rather than automatic, so it didn't automatically fail over to the backup transformer.

- The crew did not routinely train transformer switchover procedures.

- The two generators were both using a single non-redundant fuel pump (which was never intended to supply fuel to the generators!), which did not automatically restart after power was restored.

- The main engine automatically shut down when the primary coolant pump lost power, rather than using an emergency water supply or letting it overheat.

- The backup generator did not come online in time.

It's a classic Swiss Cheese model. A lot of things had to go wrong for this accident to happen. Focusing on that one wire isn't going to solve all the other issues. Wires, just like all other parts, will occasionally fail. One wire failure should never have caused an incident of this magnitude. Sure, there should probably be slightly better procedures for checking the wiring, but next time it'll be a failed sensor, actuator, or controller board.

If we don't focus on providing and ensuring a defense-in-depth, we will sooner or later see another incident like this.

[0]: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=znWl_TuUPp0

Basically, the line of causation of the mishap has to pass through a metaphorical block of Swiss cheese, and a mishap only occurs if all the holes in the cheese line up. Otherwise, something happens (planned or otherwise) that allows you to dodge the bullet this time.

Meaning a) it's important to identify places where firebreaks and redundancies can be put in place to guard against failures further upstream, and b) it's important to recognize times when you had a near-miss, and still fix those root causes as well.

Which is why the "retrospectives are useless" crowd spins me up so badly.

Edit wars aside, it's a nice philosophical question.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Francis_Scott_Key_Bridge_(Balt...

The bad contact with the wire was just the trigger, that should have been recoverable had the regular fuel pumps been running.

That's everybody - captain, bridge crew, deck crew, cook, etc.

So - how many of those 22 will be your engineering crew? How many of those engineers would be on duty, when this incident happened? And once things start going wrong, and you're sending engineers off to "check why Pump #83, down on Deck H, shows as off-line" or whatever - how many people do you have left in the big, complex engineering control room - trying to figure out what's wrong and fix it, as multiple systems fail, in the maybe 3 1/2 minutes between the first failure and when collision becomes inevitable?

Was a FMECA (Failure Mode, Effects, and Criticality Analysis) performed on the design prior to implementation in order to find the single points of failure, and identify and mitigate their system level effects?

Evidence at hand suggests "No."

Instant classic destined for the engineering-disasters-drilled-into-1st-year-engineers canon (or are the other swiss cheese holes too confounding)

Where do you think it would fit on the list?

Insurance providers insuring ships in US waters should also be required to permanently deny insurance coverage to vessels found to be out of compliance, though I doubt the insurance companies would want to play ball.

Sucks to be any of the YouTubers influencers today telling everyone they should use WAGO connectors in all their walls.

Seriously though, impressive to trace the issue down this closely. I am at best an amateur DIY electrician, but I am always super careful about the quality of each connection.