- Claude Code’s sandboxing is a complete joke. There should be no ‘off switch.’ Sandboxing should not be opt in. It should not have full read access over the file system by default.
I really want more security people to get involved in the LLM space because everyone seems to have just lost their minds.
If you look at this thing through a security lens it’s horrifying, which was a cause of frustration when Anthropic changed their TOS to ban use of alternative clients with a subscription. I don’t want to use that Swiss cheese.
- Author here. I helped creating Falco (CNCF runtime security) and built this (Veto) to fix the path-based identity problem we all shipped a decade ago. The dynamic linker bypass in the "where it breaks" section is the part I'm most interested in discussing. It's a class of evasion that no current eval framework measures. Happy to answer questions about the BPF LSM implementation.
by rogerrogerr
2 subcomments
- > No jailbreak, no special prompting. The agent just wanted to finish the task.
Good lord, why do people use LLMs to write on this topic? It destroys credibility.
- The adversary can reason now, and our security tools weren't built for that.
Leo di Donato, who helped create Falco, the cloud native runtime security, wrote a technical deep dive into how Claude Code bypassed it's own denylist and sandbox. And introduces Veto, a kernel-level enforcement engine built into the Ona platform.
by poppafuze
2 subcomments
- hilarious they purposefully left out SELinux. try that in ramalama.
- Thank you for this write up. I am still lightyears behind this deep knowledge, but feel like I learned from your post the vocabulary to get started.