For example, I'd be more than happy to pentest some govt websites here in Germany, if the very act of visiting them with a non-standard browser couldn't somehow already be misconstrued as breaking various hacking laws. No thanks! Keep your security vulnerabilities.

A nice addition would be to add who is hosting their email. First handful I've looked at are all outlook.com, which seems a much bigger privacy & security risk than not using DNSSEC.

Headlines: 3.000 governmental sites use tracking cookies illegally, over 1.000 database management interfaces are publicly reachable, 99% of governmental email is poorly encrypted.

1. Countries with strong e-government and HIGH understanding of its requirements rank LOW (good!)

2. Countries with evolving e-government practices and LOW understanding of the implications rank HIGH (bad!)

3. Countries FAR BEHIND in e-government practices rank LOW (...good?)

Goes to show that globally we need more tech-literate people on the forefront of politics, so that the proper priorities are also set in execution...

I don't see how such thing could go out in the public calling out government security when they didn't do the bare minimum of checking if the sites they "monitor" are truly governmental sites.

https[:]//erasmus-plus.ec.europa.eu/sites/default/files/2026-05/mortal-kombat-2-cs.pdf

I have been working on similar project, focusing on lithuanian-only "goverment" sites, but it's not perfectly obvious how to recognise public vs private websites, as at least half of those are managed privatelly, used publically. (Mostly due that was cheaper and/or because lack of requirements and/or other weird situations.)

But yeah, I can confirm that stats are same-ish in Lithuanian web too. I just havent finished gathering data yet, it will take a while.

It has 3 HIGH RISK issues because

    - DNSSEC is not configured
    - Few cookies are send and (ALERT!) Google marketing cookie
    - Missing ROA

I get it, it's aggregator but showing red maps is at leals sensationalists

Seems that results are taken from internet.nl, which has WAY better UI than page posted.

https://batch.internet.nl/site/um.warszawa.pl/17768032/#

When the GDPR became active eight or so years ago, we got a few GDPR related requests to our service. Basically strongly worded requests to remove their data and account, which we of course honored. All of these came from Germany. Nobody else really cared. But it was kind of curious quickly that happened. What was interesting is that we had zero such requests before that law came into power. And it's not like we were misbehaving or would have denied such a request. This was more a matter of principle: "I now finally have the right to ask this, so I'm going to."

Germany is a big reason GDPR got so complicated and why, hopefully soon, it will be updated to not be fixated on just cookies so much. It never really was about the cookies but about data handling and sharing.

Any mobile app you install might track you without setting cookies and you can't install an ad blocker in those either. That's why Google loves apps so much. You don't actually need cookies for those. There usually is no cookie screen when you install one usually (unless it's a web app packaged up as an app). But sharing personal data with a third party provider is still problematic under GDPR. If you read the actual law, it barely mention cookies at all. The "must have consent screen for cookies" is just the common (mis)-interpretation for laymen; because it's the most visible impact that this has had on them. When it comes to date removal and other requests, it's less about features you have and more about processes you use for complying with legal requests. That can be a person answering emails and doing things manually. Doesn't scale if you get a lot of requests but it would be fine legally.

GDPR was adopted more than a decade ago and our governments still can't do it right, yet they expect everyone else to get it right. Amazing regulation.