“But in subsequent cases, particularly McCutcheon and Cruz, this Court has squarely rejected undue influence as a permissible basis for the Government to regulate campaign finances and limit political speech. In those more recent cases, the Court has spoken clearly and definitively: Congress may not restrict spending because of “the possibility that” political parties, individuals, or outside groups that spend “large sums may garner influence over or access to elected officials.” McCutcheon, 572 U. S., at 208 (quotation marks omitted). Nor may they do so “to limit the appearance of mere influence or access.” Ibid. Speech regulations may not target “general gratitude.” Id., at 192. The Court has reasoned that “[i]ngratiation and access . . . are not corruption,” but instead “embody a central feature of democracy—that constituents support candidates who share their beliefs and interests, and candidates who are elected can be expected to be responsive to those concerns.” Ibid. (quotation marks omitted). The Court now recognizes “only one legitimate governmental interest for restricting campaign finances: preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption.” Id., at 206–207. Moreover, “Congress may target only a specific type of corruption—‘quid pro quo’ corruption.” Id., at 207. And quid pro quo corruption in turn is something specific— contributions in exchange for official action. “That Latin phrase captures the notion of a direct exchange of an official act for money. The hallmark of corruption is the financial quid pro quo: dollars for political favors.” Id., at 192 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Although the “line between quid pro quo corruption and general influence may seem vague at times,” “the distinction must be respected in order to safeguard basic First Amendment rights.” Id., at 209. In drawing that distinction, “the First Amendment requires us to err on the side of protecting political speech rather than suppressing it.” Ibid. (quotation marks omitted).”