But this is the ultimate "grant me dictatorial powers so I can do good" play.

Rather than narrow and specific - it's a broad based law that suddenly touches everyone even though offenders are a small percentage and should be able to be targeted more efficiently.

Voluntary for whom? The service provider? Can I opt out of getting scanned?

> Does it touch encrypted messages? - No. End-to-end encrypted communications were never scanned but providers could deploy client-side scanning under this law.

So it circumvents e2e encryption?

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How would these laws prevent me from just side loading my own open source client?

1. allow MITM decryption by a privileged authority

2. require all devices doing E2EE have a non-user-modifiable piece of functionality to scan on-device

The second is the Apple style on-device CSAM scanner? I have to say that I do sometimes think about it while taking a photo of my baby playing in the bathtub - photos like my parents have of me which have been kind of nice to see later. It would be a pity if I had to have a separate analog camera just for baby photos because then I'd need to learn the whole developing film stuff.

Unlike governments, generally, the companies may use control over communications for any purpose. For example, a surveillance-based advertising services is one purpose that we know about. The companies can collaborate with any party; it may be another another company, it may be a government. The company can utilise surveillance data collected and/or its ability to throttle and censor communications to further any purpose. The parties with whom the company collaborates may potentially use the data for any purpose

Unfortunately for users, the company is not required to disclose with whom it collaborates nor the terms of such collaborations. Hence users have no way to verfiy. Users of these "free services", have few, if any, rights against the company

This situation is preventable. What enables it to exist is user "consent" to ceding control over their private communications ("chat control") to so-called "tech" companies

1. This is accomplished through granting the company total control over the client software, e.g., "automatic updates'. The company effectvely (a) blocks chat participants from using their own client software and (b) forces chat participants to use client software controlled by the so-called 'tech" company. This software is provided for free and primarily serves the company, not the user, advancing the company's commercial interests, e.g., surveillance-based advertising services, at the expense of the user's privacy and security interests

This fact was summarised in a submission that reached the HN front page yesterday: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=48792203

They just want total control.

Instead of using the criticism to improve the system, the corrupt system starts to attack and forbid the criticism.

"A temporary derogation from the ePrivacy Directive that allowed (but did not require) providers to scan private messages of unsuspected users for potential child sexual abuse material."

Does that imply it's currently not allowed?

EDIT: apparently not enforced at least:

"Chat Control 1.0 expires

The legal ground for voluntary, indiscriminate scanning ends. Google, Meta, Microsoft, and Snap state they will continue scanning private messages regardless. "

Concretely, are there documented examples of abuses ? Are the checks & balance sufficient ? I understand ChatControl 2.0 goes way beyond, be it goes "beyond" enough that it does not get a majority in parlement, and can't move forward.

But for CC1.0 we don't need to imagine anymore - we have 2 years of application. Is that enough to evaluate ?

I think there is no way to fix this system from the inside - it is designed to be abused like that. We need an alternative system.

Chat Control passed first round in EU Parliament

https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=48819008

My answer: regulating something:)